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Introduction
The political economy literature is increasingly called upon to help gain a better understanding of the pattern of protection. 1 For example, it predicts that highly concentrated sectors will obtain higher levels of protection, as free-riding by rms lobbying for protection is easier to overcome in small groups. Similarly, declining industries will receive higher levels of protection as the opportunity cost of lobbying is lower in a slow-growing industry than in a dynamic sector. These and other predictions of the political economy literature have been tested on cross-section data sets for manufacturing activities in developed economies. 2 This empirical literature usually concentrates on the role of di erent domestic pressure groups in the determination of protection. However, with the increasing importance of Foreign Direct Investment fdi, pressures arising from the participation of foreign groups in lobbying should be taken into account. 3 Arguably, such pressures are likely to be particularly important in the manufacturing sectors of developing countries where fdi is sizeable. 4 Focusing on the role of fdi may help obtain a more complete picture of the political-economy determinants of protection for at least two reasons. First, there is a tradition in the development literature that gives a prominent role to fdi in the process of industrialization. 5 Second, the role of fdi has long 1 been recognized in the trade literature. In recognition of the importance of fdi, a trade-theoretic literature has developed starting in the late eighties with Bhagwati's 1987 concept of quid pro quo fdi, which takes place in anticipation of tari increases in the host country and can potentially di use the threat of protection. 6 Similarly, i n a political-economy setup, Hillman and Ursprung 1993 show that tari -jumping fdi can result in lower levels of protection at equilibrium, even in cases where fdi lobbies for protection and its lobby technology is as e cient as the technology of domestic rms. So far, these theoretical predictions have only been tested on the US, where quid pro quo fdi is more likely to occur than in developing countries. 7 Also, the US tari , like that of other developed countries, has been bound by the GATT for a long time, with tari reductions taking place in a multilateral context according to straight line formula reductions, making it di cult to discern the e ects of pressure-group activity on trade-policy formulation. At the same time, there is little evidence for developing countries where the problem of tari -binding has not arisen, at least until recently.
This paper looks for further evidence on the potential e ects of fdi on trade-policy formulation. It also provides as a case study in a developing-country context where quid pro quo fdi is likely to be less important. 8 The evidence is for the Mexican manufacturing sector during the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . A Mexican case study is relevant for at least four reasons. First, a broad trade reform took place during this period, purpose is to take advantage of cheap labor and establish dominant positions in the host country's market. The debate is covered in Helleiner 1989 . 6 The in uence of quid pro quo fdi on tari s and welfare is also examined in Bhagwati, Brecher, Dinopolous and Srinivisan 1987, Bhagwati, Dinopolous and Wong 1992, and Grossman and Helpman 1994. 7 The empirical literature agrees on the fact that trade policy is an important determinant o f fdi in the US, Europe and Japan, but there is little evidence that quid pro quo fdi has successfully reduced protection. For empirical evidence, using di erent and interesting methodologies, see Azrak and Wynne 1995 , Barrell and Pain 1999 , Belderbos 1997 , Blonigen and Feenstra 1996 , and Blonigen and Figlio 1998. 8 One exception is Kraemer 1995, which also focuses on the Mexican trade policy reform. Kraemer concludes that the weight of foreign investors in an industry is of no importance for the sectoral structure of liberalization. The methodology used in this study is di erent from the one in Kraemer's, as discussed in section 3. so it is possible to analyze the pattern of changes in protection. Second, Mexico was a country with a signi cant and growing share of fdi. Third, unlike most of the evidence on the political economy literature so far, Mexico was not a member of GATT, so it had freedom in tari -setting well beyond that available for GATT members. Finally, a panel data base of manufacturing rms is available, so it is possible to measure relatively accurately, indicators of market structure recognized to be important in the determination of the demand for protection.
To a n ticipate the main results, it turns out that the correlates of tari changes in Mexican manufacturing protection during the period are broadly consistent with the view that fdi is an important political economy factor" along the lines that would be predicted by the recent literature on endogenous protection. That is, the presence of fdi generally leads to lower tari s. However, whether fdi occurs in an import-competing or export-oriented sector should also matter. Once we control for fdi trade-orientation, it turns out that import-competing sectors with large shares of fdi tend to be more protected than import-competing sectors with no fdi. This`bias' in the structure of protection structure was partially corrected during the Mexican trade policy reform.
Section 2 discusses brie y Mexican trade policy reform during the period covered by the study. Section 3 reviews the theoretical predictions from the endogenous tradepolicy literature, emphasizing the role of fdi. Using the in uence-driven approach, we show that the usual prediction in the literature namely that tari levels and fdi should be negatively correlated, which is not borne out by the evidence, is not robust. Section 4 describes the model speci cation, while section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Mexican trade policy reform
Following the 1982 debt crisis, new trade restrictions were introduced, and both trade and fdi plunged in 1984, total trade was 40 percent below its 1980 level, and fdi declined by 50 percent. Trade policy reform started in 1985 with an important cut in quantitative restrictions import-licensing mainly. It was followed by a rst round of tari reduction in April 1986 according to Mexico's GATT accession and completed by a before-schedule second round in December 1987 Economic Solidarity Pact. Since then, until 1990, the structure of protection remained almost unchanged. Thus Mexico's trade and fdi policies were sharply reoriented towards more openness starting in the mid-eighties and during the period covered by this study.
Indicators of the magnitude of the trade reforms for manufacturing during 1985-90 appear in table 1. They suggest that reduction in protection in manufacturing was swift and drastic. In less than three years, both quantitative and tari restrictions were substantially reduced, as well as their dispersion. 9 However, the impact on imports was delayed, as the import penetration ratio only increased after 1988. This lagged response was partly due to weak demand, re ected by production levels below their long run trend. It was also the consequence of the strong real depreciation of the Mexican peso during 1986-1987 which allowed domestic producers to adjust more smoothly to the new exposure to international competition.
INSERT T ABLE 1 HERE: GLOBAL TRENDS IN MEXICAN
MANUFACTURING: [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] .
The regulatory environment traditionally discouraged fdi in most industries, with minority participation restrictions and prior authorization from the central government. Reforms began in 1986, with the initiation of debt-to-equity conversion schemes and the exemption of small to medium levels of investment from government approval 9 The reduction in e ective protection was also substantial close to 50 percent o n a verage when comparing the 1984-1985 period to the 1986-1987 period.
for foreign majority participation. Total FDI in ows primarily to manufacturing correspondingly increased, although they dropped again in 1988 with the end of the debt-to-equity s w aps program. However, the trend was soon reversed again in 1989 with the adoption of a new law, which eased substantially the regulatory obstacles to foreign investment. 10 Given the change in trade policy and the perspective o f a nafta agreement, it is clear that this new generation of fdi was no longer of the tari -jumping type, but rather outward-oriented, as illustrated by the case of the maquiladoras. 11 Close consultation with business has been a key factor in the re-orientation of Mexico's trade policy. The GATT 1993 trade policy review of Mexico reports a high level of cooperation and linkage between the government and the private sectors through entities such as the Coordinating Body for Foreign Trade Entreprises coece. There is also strong evidence of lobbying during the reform period, as reported by Kraemer 1995 . A survey by Story Mexican Businessman in 1986 reports that 80 percent of Mexican industrialists turn to their industrial association when trying to in uence a public-policy decision and only 3 percent think it is useless to attempt to in uence policy by a n y means. Moreover, the same survey classi es trade protection as the policy that can be more easily in uenced. Presumably then, industrialist lobbies had an important in uence in the determination of Mexican trade policy. But were owners of foreign capital also important players in the determination of Mexican trade policy and, if so, in which direction did they a ect it? 10 Majority i n vestment in nonrestricted sectors was eligible to receive automatic approval if it met six clearly de ned criteria e.g., capital originates outside Mexico, satisfaction of existing environmental regulations, etc... Limited access to the Mexican stock market was permitted through special trust funds. Automatic approval was granted if the National Foreign Investment Commission failed to reach a decision within 45 days. 11 Note that in our empirical analysis trade and industrial data is corrected for maquiladoras activities, as these are clearly under a di erent regime that the rest of the economy.
3 Predictions of the endogenous protection literature
As suggested by Magee, Brock and Young 1989, it is useful to view policy choices as being determined in a political market" in which the choice of policy plays the same role as prices in an ordinary market. An equilibrium is reached when policies have been adjusted to the point where the marginal value of resources spent b y opposing parties is equal. In practice, however, how those who seek protection and how those who oppose it exert their in uence, and hence the outcome, depends on the institutional context or supply side of the market which is usually treated summarily in the literature. Fortunately, a s w e are concentrating on the pattern of protection across sectors, the institutional context is less important as it presumably a ects all sectors more or less equally. 12 
Endogenous tari s in the presence of FDI
Much of the theoretical literature on endogenous tari s in the presence of fdi is theoretical and predicts generally that the presence of fdi should lead to lower levels of tari s regardless of the approach trade-theoretic or political-economy. To begin with, on welfare grounds and in imperfectly competitive markets markets in which fdi is more likely to occur as suggested by Diaz-Alejandro, 1970 or Markusen, 1995, the presence of foreign capital reduces the rationale for tari s based on pro t-shifting to domestically-based rms. If foreign-owned rms repatriate their pro ts, then there is no reason to try to shift pro ts to domestically based rms. In the extreme case where all domestically-based rms are foreign-owned, the case for protection reduces to the usual terms-of-trade argument. 13 Next, in models where fdi participates in the decision-making process through lobbying, it has been shown that the presence of fdi is likely to lead to lower tari s. Hillman and Ursprung 1993 argue that even in the case of circumventing fdi where foreign rms lobby for protection, the outcome is likely to imply a lower level of protection. This is because when fdi rises, import competition is reduced, as foreign rms now sell from the host country. This, in turn, reduces the gain to national rms from protectionist policies in their home market. Competition now comes from inside the border. Thus, the incentive of national rms to contribute for protection is lower and, therefore, the entry of fdi may result in lower levels of protection. 14 In a trade-theoretic context, Bhagwati 1987 and Bhagwati et al. 1987 introduced the notion of quid pro quo fdi quid pro quo fdi is motivated by a protectionist threat in the host country, and showed that it helps defuse protectionist pressures through several channels see Bhagwati, Dinopoulos and Wong 1992. First, fdi can buy goodwill from the host country government and, therefore, reduce protection through its supply side. Second, it can co-opt labor unions and weaken their incentives to lobby for protection`to save jobs'. Third,`anti-foreign-bashing' can be built by obtaining visibility through fdi. F ourth, it may co-opt the host country rms that seek to lobby for protection directly through joint-ventures with domestic rms or indirectly by participating in industrial lobbying. 15 Thus for all the above reasons one would expect that: the larger is the share of fdi, the lower the tari .
The empirical literature on quid pro quo fdi and tari formation is small and restricted to fdi in the US. Azrak and Wynne 1995 using industrial data, showed that Japanese fdi in the US is sensitive to the probability that an antidumping duty will be imposed i.e., expected increase in protection; but they do not test for the e ect of this fdi on tari s in the us. Blonigen and Feenstra 1997 con rm Azrak and Wynne's nding, but also look at the e ects of fdi on tari s. They nd mixed evidence for the protectionist di usion e ect of quid pro quo fdi at the industry level. Blonigen and Figlio 1998 also found the same result using a di erent methodology. By focusing directly on the voting behavior of senators in the US, Blonigen and Figlio found that legislators who leaned towards free trade relaxed their protectionist stance after the entry of fdi. On the other hand, legislators who were initially protectionists, toughened their protectionist positions after the entry of fdi.
Unlike the theoretical literature that appears unanimous, the empirical literature gives elusive evidence on the e ects of fdi on tari levels. Thus one is brought t o question the robustness of that prediction. Below, we develop several arguments that suggest a positive correlation between fdi share and tari levels.
Can FDI lead to higher tari s?
There at least two reasons why, i n d e v eloping countries tari s may be higher in sectors with large shares of fdi. First, owners of foreign capital i.e., fdi m a y h a ve access to a better lobbying technology. One can imagine that multinational companies have a larger experience of lobbying in di erent countries which they can adapt to the host government. Second, governments may be more sensitive t o fdi interests than to the interests of nationals. This may be so for several second-best arguments ranging from the fact that foreign companies may be more credible in the lobbying game than domestic producers e.g., due to nancial constraints domestic producers cannot keep their promises, to the perception that fdi brings technology spillovers. For these and other reasons, governments may be more receptive t o fdi demands, as notably has been the case recently when several Eastern European countries negotiated bilateral trade agreements with the EU. The automobile sector in Mercosur countries provides another example of a highly protected industry with a signi cant presence of fdi.
To simplify, focus on the case where the government is more sensitive to demands from owners of foreign capital than from owners of domestic capital. Even then, somewhat surprisingly, this is not enough to result in higher tari s in sectors with large shares of fdi. As will be shown below, the weight given to fdi in the government's objective function needs to be larger than the sum of the weights given to owners of domestic capital and to social welfare for this to happen .
Take the following familiar setup from the Grossman and Helpman 1994 framework. Assume a small open economy with n sectors producing with a constant returns to scale technology employing sector-speci c capital and intersectorally mobile labour. Sector speci c capital can be domestic or foreign-owned. Sector 0 employs only labour under constant returns to scale. Thus the productivity of labour in sector 0 determines the equilibrium wage. Good 0 serves as num eraire. Consumers have identical and additive quasi-linear utility function. The utility function is quasi-linear in good 0. This allows to abstract from income and substitution e ects in the consumption of goods which are produced employing foreign capital.
The lobbying game is a l a Grossman and Helpman where owners of sector-speci c capital in each sector domestic and foreign face the government with a`truthful' contribution function conditioned on the domestic price in their sector i.e, the world price plus the tari . 16 Truthfulness implies that in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium, the derivatives of the sector contribution with respect to the domestic tari is equal to the derivative of the pro t function with respect to the tari ; i.e., the marginal cost of a tari increase should be equal to its marginal bene t for the lobbying group. 17 Owners of domestic and foreign capital share the same lobbying technology, but lobby through di erent groups. 18 The government's objective function combines political contributions and national social welfare. The latter re ects government's concern for the average voter. Thus, the government's problem can be written as max t V t Ct + C ? t + Wt 1 where C = C ? are the contribution functions of domestic and foreign-owned rms respectively all variables refering to owners of foreign rms will be denoted with à ?'; t is the tari vector; W is social welfare; is the weight given to social welfare in the government's objective function and is the weight given to foreign rms' contributions in the government's objective function.
Given the above simplifying assumptions, there are n rst-order conditions that can be solved independently. T h us, using the truthfulness property of the contribution function, yields the following implicit expression for the optimal tari in sector i : where s ? i is the share of output produced by foreign-owned capital. The term outside the square brackets in 6 is the optimal Grossman-Helpman tari in the absence of foreign rms. The second term in squared brackets captures the e ects of foreign rms' lobbying on the determination of the optimal tari .
Proposition The optimal tari in sector i will increase with the share of fdi in sector i if and only if the weight given to fdi political contributions in the government's objective function is larger than the sum of the weights given to domestic rms 11 contributions plus social welfare.
Proof. From 6 note that @t i =@s ? i 0 , 1 + . 2
If the government gives the same weight to foreign rms' political contributions as to domestic rms, i.e. = 1, then tari s would be negatively correlated with the share of fdi. This is so because the income of owners of foreign capital does not enter the national welfare function which in turn gives incentives to the government t o h a ve lower tari s in sectors with large shares of fdi, based on relative w elfare e ects. 19 Note also that the fact that the government gives more weight to foreign rms than to domestic rms' political contributions is not a su cient condition for tari s to increase with the share of fdi. The reason for this is that domestic rms' pro ts enter twice in the government's objective function; rst through contributions and second through social welfare, whereas foreing rms pro ts enter only through political contributions. Finally, if the government does not distinguish between domestic and foreign rms and includes foreign rm's pro ts in its welfare function, then the share of fdi would have no e ect on the tari level, i.e. = 1 + .
Does FDI trade-orientation matter?
Is fdi in export-competing sectors going to a ect tari formation in the same way a s fdi in import competing sectors? This is a pertinent question, especially for Mexico with its proximity to the US market. To our knowledge, there is no evidence on this. We address the issue by using an interacting term between net import-penetration nm=y T and the share of fdi s ? i n e a c h sector. The net import-penetration ratio imports minus exports divided by output is an indicator of`revealed comparative disadvantage' that serves as a proxy for a sector's trade orientation. 20 where mFDI is the interacting variable, m is the level of imports, x is the level of exports, y T is total output and s ? is the share of output produced by foreign rms. 21 A positive sign for mFDI in the tari equation estimated in the empirical section will imply that sectors which are import competing i.e, have a comparative disadvantage and where there is an important presence of fdi, will tend to have higher tari s. And this by proposition 1 will suggest that the weight given to foreign rms political contributions in the government's objective function is higher than the sum of the weights given to domestic rms political contributions and social welfare.
Other determinants of the patterns of protection
With the few exceptions noted above, the empirical literature has neglected the role of fdi and has concentrated on the determinants discussed below. These, and some theoretical arguments also brie y reviewed below, are relevant for the Mexican case and are included in the empirical speci cation. To justify the empirical speci cation below and place our ndings in perspective, we note the following :
Protection having the characteristics of a public good, and contributions to lobbying being voluntary, organizational costs will be an increasing function of group size. Hence tari s should be positively correlated with industry concentration. 22 If labor unions are well organized, 23 industries with signi cant shares of employment will obtain higher wages and be more protected. 24 Large sectors will have more political weight. Regulators will be sensitive t o the size of the sector. Moreover, the lower the import-penetration ratio imports over output, the lower the relative w eight of consumers compared to producers in the government's objective function. 25 Thus, the lower the importpenetration ratio net imports over output, the higher the rate of protection. For a theoretical justi cation, see Grossman and Helpman 1994a. Rodrik 1995 challenges this result on empirical grounds see Anderson, 1980. Declining industries tend to obtain more protection see Hillman, 1982, or Brainard and Verdier, 1994 . In a dynamic context, the`compensation e ect' predicts that declining industries slow-growing will lobby more as the opportunity cost of lobbying will be lower. This suggests that import-penetration ratios should be positively correlated with changes in tari s.
Labor intensive sectors tend to be more protected than capital intensive sectors see for example, Finger and Harrison, 1994 or the survey by Rodrik, 1995. There is no clear theoretical explanation for this phenomenon. 26 The institutional context. In Mexico rms are legally obliged to join chambers that are either industry or region-speci c. If rms in a speci c industry are spread across all the country, then their in uence over the government's Rodrik, 1995 Magee, 1997 , or Bilal, 1998 . 23 And there is evidence that they were in Mexico. coparmex is the employer's confederation and had strong in uence on government's decisions as reported by Kraemer 1995. 24 Kruger and Summers 1987 nd strong evidence for the US. and for a theoretical justi cation, see Cadot et al. 1997 . 25 To see this, note that m=y = c , y=y = c=y , 1, where m denotes imports or net imports, c is consumption and y is the level of production. 26 Rodrik 1995 argues that in cross-country regressions, this result may capture the fact that labor abundant countries tend to be poor countries with important g o vernment revenue constraint leading them to impose higher tari s. But this does not explain the results in a cross-section context. decision-making process should be higher as they would exert their in uence through di erent associations chambers. Moreover, all trade legislation in Mexico has to be approved by the Senate, implying that some geographic dispersion may help to defend the interest of an industry. 27 An index of geographic concentration should then be negatively correlated with tari s.
Empirical speci cation
The politically-determined tari equation is given by: where the signs under the variables summarize the previous discussion. In, 8, t i;t is tari in sector i at period t, H is the Her ndal index of rm concentration, k=` i s the capital labor ratio, stands for the share of labor in each sector, nm=y T is the import penetration ratio de ned in 7, nm=y T is the change in import penetration, G is an indicator of geographic concentration which is time-invariant and s ? is the share of output produced by rms with at least 10 percent of foreign capital, mFDI is the interacting term between import penetration and share of fdi de ned in 7. 28 Data are described in the appendix. The time-period covers 1985 to 1990 and is for the 2-digit Mexican National Account Manufacturing Categories 39 sectors, with some aggregation due to incompatibility with trade data.
Estimation of such an equation is prone to endogeneity problems as fdi may b e due to tari -jumping or to high price-cost margins in some sectors, which themselves may be due to high tari s. Also, the labor share in sector i may depend on tari levels and the presence of fdi in that sector. Therefore, equation 8 where the signs below the variables will be discussed shortly. In the above equations, pcm is the price-cost margin, wage is the average wage rate, k=y T is the capital-output ratio, y is the share of output of sector i in the economy and pen = m=y + x , m is the import penetration ratio. 30 According to the discussion above, we expect t it to enter positively in 10 and in 11 as a higher tari should increase both the labor share and the price-cost margin. The sign of t it in 9 should be positive i f fdi is of the tari -jumping type. The lagged tari is also expected to enter positively into the fdi equation as high tari s in period t , 1 m a y be positively correlated with expected increases in tari s as suggested by Blonigen and Feenstra, 1996 . If fdi is of the quid pro quo type then an expected increase in protection should lead to higher levels of fdi. 31 The sign of the share of fdi in the labour equation would also depend on the type of foreign direct investment. 29 The inclusion of an import-equation as in Tre er, 1993 would have been desirable, but no data on import prices were available. However, we performed a Hausman-Wu exogeneity test over the whole panel and we could not reject at the hypothesis that nm=y T is exogenous even for very low levels of con dence H=0.27. This may be due to the fact that we use net import penetration ratio as the explanatory variable and not the classic import-penetration ratio. 30 Alternative speci cations were estimated and are discussed in the next section. 31 This is probably a very rough proxy for expected increases in protection and one should ideally work with anti-dumping investigation data as Azrak and Wynne 1995 or Blonigen and Feenstra 1997 did for the US. The constraint here is that Mexico had no anti-dumping authority before 1986 and only rati ed Article VI of the GATT in March 1988. By 1990 only 19 anti-dumping investigation were concluded which leaves us with very few non-zero observations to carry out any econometric analysis.
The price-cost margin should enter positively in the fdi equation as high pro ts should attract more fdi. Industry-concentration, H, should also enter positively into the fdi equation as this may capture the idea of potentially lower levels of competition in the domestic market. H is expected to enter negatively into the share of labor equation as the share of labor is used as a proxy for labor union strength, and it is expected that high levels of industry concentration should make labor organization more di cult as capital owners will more easily oppose their formation. H should enter positively into the price-cost margin equation as industry concentration facilitates price collusion implicit or explicit. The geographic-concentration index, G, should enter negatively in the fdi equation, as it is expected to capture competition in factor markets. G should enter positively in the labor share equation, since the more geographically concentrated an industry is, the easier it should be to organize labor unions. Geographic concentration should also facilitate collusive behaviour by rms and, therefore, we expect a positive sign in the price-cost margin equation. The wage should be negatively correlated with fdi as sectors with lower wages should attract fdi. The correlation with labor-shares should be negative, if one expects this to capture demand for labor. The share of output y should be positively correlated with labor shares, as a larger output implies a larger labor demand. Finally, the capital output ratio k=y T which serves as a proxy for capacity utilization is expected to be positively correlated with price-cost margins pcm and a higher exposure to international competition i.e., high value for pen is expected to decrease price-cost margins. 32 These three equations attempt to resolve the endogeneity problems mentioned above. 33 Moreover, the estimation of an fdi equation equation 9 allows us to draw some conclusions on the type of fdi that took place before and during the reform.
Equations 9-11 are estimated using a 3SLS technique, which also helps control for possible missing exogenous variables. All regressions are run in double-log form except for the two exogenous variables that can take negative v alues i.e., pen and nm=y T .
Results
We wish rst to identify the extent and the direction in which fdi a ected Mexico's tari structure. Second, we w ould also like to identify changes that may h a ve occurred during the trade policy reform. To answer these questions, we report rst results of regressions for the whole panel 1985-1990 table 2. This allows us to identify the e ect of fdi on Mexico's tari structure. To capture any c hanges that may h a ve occured during the reform, we estimated the equations for two sub-panels, 1985-1987 and 1988-1990 to identify any reform e ects table 3. 34 We also ran regressions for the two end-years, 1986 and 1990 table 4 and compared results again. Finally, a s regressions on levels at the end-period may be a ected by what happened in the past, we report regression results both for di erences over the whole panel and for the di erence between 1986 and 1990 table 5.
Determining tari s in Mexico: 1986-1990
The results in table 2 suggest that Mexico's tari structure signi cantly re ects industrial lobbying along the lines discussed above. 35 Indeed, virtually all variables have the expected signs, most of them highly signi cant statistically. F or example, industrial concentration, H; is highly correlated with the tari structure, according to 34 Only table 2 contains results for the four equations. Tables 3 to 5 report the results for the tari and fdi equations only. The other results are available from the authors. 35 Results reported in tables 2 to 5 do not include industry or time dummies. However regression run including dummies are consistent with the ones reported in the tables. Moreover, note that the time-invariance of G also captures some of the industry-speci c e ects. theoretical predictions. Likewise, highly concentrated sectors tend to receive higher tari s. Also, sectors with a high capital labor ratio k=` receive l o wer protection, corroborating the survey ndings reported above according to which e n trepreneurs believe that trade policy is most amenable to in uence by lobbying activity. The labor union proxy is also highly signi cant suggesting that sectors that are large employers of labor tend to be more protected. Moreover, declining sectors i.e., those where the change in the import-penetration ratio, nm=y T has been large also enjoy larger tari s. Also, as predicted, geographic concentration, G; of an industry tends to lead to lower levels of tari s. The only result at odds with the a priori predictions is that sectors with large import-penetration ratios, nm=y T ; enjoy higher tari s, but as mentioned earlier, this seems to be an empirical regularity. O v erall, these preliminary results are surprisingly coherent and consistent with a priori expectations.
What is the in uence of fdi on Mexico's tari structure? Note rst that the two variables capturing the e ects of fdi are very signi cant 99 level. The coe cient in front of the share of output produced by foreign rms, s ? ; is negative, a result consistent with several explanations o ered in section 3.2. Thus, at rst sight, in the case of Mexico at least, the presence of fdi leads to lower levels of protection.
As discussed earlier, however, one would expect that fdi trade-orientation matters. Recall that the import-penetration ratio controls for the trade-orientation of each sector, but it takes the share of fdi as given. The interacting term mF DI = nm=y T s ? , captures simultaneously the e ect of fdi and its trade-orientation.
The coe cient is positive and highly signi cant statistically, suggesting that importcompeting sectors with large fdi shares tend to be more protected. According to the proposition of section 3.1, this would suggest that the weight given to foreign rms in the government's objective function is higher than the weight given to social welfare. Of course, this is only one, among several, possible interpretations as the result could also be due to a better lobbying technology by foreign rms. 36 36 To test for the robustness of results, we ran regressions without including the interacting terms.
INSERT T ABLE 2 HERE: MEXICO'S TARIFF STRUCTURE 1986-1990
What kind of fdi? The fdi equation tends to suggest that most of Mexican fdi is of the tari -jumping type. Sectors with large tari s tend to have higher levels of fdi, as indicated by the positive and signi cant coe cient in front o f t. Moreover, the price-cost margin, pcm, also enters positively in the fdi equation, and it is itself positively and signi cantly correlated with tari s. The lagged tari ,t t,1 ; is supposed to be a proxy for the expected increase in protection to try to capture quid pro quo fdi. The coe cient turns out to be signi cant, but negative, which raises questions as to what that variable is really capturing. Industry concentration ,H; also seems to attract fdi, whereas geographic concentration of an industry is not an attracting factor, probably due to factor market rivalry. Finally, domestic relative w ages across industries do not seem to be an important factor in attracting fdi. All the other variables turned out to have the expected sign though some were insigni cant, with the exception of the industry concentration indicator in the price-cost margin equation and the wage in the labor equation.
So the data suggest that most of Mexican fdi was of the tari -jumping type. Sectors with large shares of fdi tend to have l o wer tari s. However, if one controls for fdi trade orientation, it turns out that import-competing sectors with large shares of fdi were over protected.
The next section focusses on the changes that occured during the reforms. Has fdi been an important political factor Was fdi in import-competing sectors still over protected after the reforms?
None of the coe cients change sign or signi cance, though the R 2 value falls a little because of multicollinearity problems. Moreover, as the number of observations is not very large, following Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 1980, we carry out an outlier analysis over the 195 observations by eliminating them one by one. Again, none of the variables in the tari equation change sign or signi cance. Of course, when dropping one observation at a time, one would miss the possibility that a combination of observations may be in uential. However, the results in table 3, where the panel is subdivided into two sub-panel containing 78 and 117 observations, show that the coe cients in front of the two fdi variables do not change signs, nor do they loose statistical signi cance. These outlier tests suggest robustness of the results with respect to the data. 20 Table 3 reports results for the two sub-periods. It can be seen that they are consistent with results for the whole panel in table 3 with the exception that the change in import penetration did not seem to be an in uential factor during the rst period. Some coe cient v alues change, but coe cients before and after the reform are all within one standard error deviation. 37 Industrial lobbying and fdi were signi cantly correlated with the tari structure both before and after the trade policy reform. 1986-1987 and 1988-1990 The picture changes, however, when we compare the two end-years in table 4. Now both industrialists' lobbying and foreigners' lobbying were signi cant players in 1986 results consistent with those reported in tables 2 and 3. In 1990 however, results change. Industrial lobbying captured by industry concentration, H, the capital labor ratio, k=`, and the labor union proxy,; are still signi cant factors. But there is a signi cant drop in fdi in uence on the tari structure. Indeed, the share of fdi s ? becomes insigni cant and the interacting term is only signi cant at the 90 level.
Determining tari s during the reforms

INSERT T ABLE 3 HERE MEXICO'S TARIFF STRUCTURE
INSERT T ABLE 4 HERE: MEXICO'S TARIFF STRUCTURE:
1986 and 1990
As argued before, the fact that fdi in import-competing sectors seems to be still over-protected in 1990, may only re ect history. Thus, table 5 reports results in rst di erences and for the di erence between 1985 and 1990 to try to capture what happened with fdi in uence during the reform.
To estimate results in rst-di erences we dropped the geographic concentration indicator since it was time invariant. We also dropped the change in import penetration, because of di culties interpreting the results.
Under this speci cation, results for the di erence between 1986 and 1990 suggest that capital labor ratios were a signi cant determinant o f c hanges in the tari structure that occurred between 1985 and 1990. Controlling for other intervening factors, sectors with an increase in capital labor ratios experience increases in tari s or smaller decreases. Surprisingly, sectors where the share of labor had increased experienced larger decreases in tari s. Sectors which experience a large increase in import penetration during the period bene t from larger increases in tari s. Changes in industry concentration do not seem to a ect changes in the tari structure.
INSERT T ABLE 5 HERE: CHANGES IN MEXICO'S TARIFF STRUCTURE log-di erences
The surprising results come from the e ects of fdi on the tari structure. Sectors where the share of fdi increased, experienced larger increases in tari s or lower decreases in tari s. 38 However, changes in the inter-acting term do not a ect changes in tari strcture. This suggest that sectors, where both fdi and import-penetration have increased simultaneously did not experience higher increases in tari s, which, in a w ay, is a correcting step, and explains the fact that the inter-acting term was only signi cant at the 90 level in 1990. This is further con rmed when regressions are run on rst log-di erences. The explanatory power of the regressions is very low, but the inter-acting term has a highly signi cant and negative coe cient, which suggests that the over-protection of fdi before the trade-policy reform tended to be partially corrected. Sectors where there has been a large increase in fdi and import-penetration tended to experience larger tari reductions. 38 This seem to rule out the possibility of quid pro quo fdi during the period.
6 Conclusions
The correlates of the tari structure for the Mexican manufacturing sector during the turbulent reforms of the second half of the eigthties, are broadly consistent with predictions from the trade literature on endogenous tari s. Subject to the caveats surrounding any statistical results from reduced-form equations with less-than-perfect proxies for the variables, the possibility of omitted e ects stemming from potential mispeci cation, and so on, it would appear that industrial lobbying was an important factor in the determination of Mexico's tari structure and its reform.
More importantly, fdi also seemed to be a signi cant player in the determination of Mexico's tari structure. The data suggest that if the presence of fdi in itself tended to lower tari s, this was not true for import-competing sectors: importcompeting sectors with large shares of fdi tended to be over-protected. However, this has been partially corrected during the trade-policy reform and it appears that in 1990 the in uence of fdi on tari structure is almost negligible. So, to answer the question in the title of this paper, it seems that fdi had an important in uence on Mexico's tari structure by obtaining higher levels of protection in import-competing sectors, but this was, at least partially, corrected by the reform of the late 1980s.
Data Sources
Data on import and exports were taken from Casar 1993. Figures on the average nominal tari by sector weighted by output were provided by Mexico's Secretar ia de Comercio y Fomento Industrial SECOFI, 1992 and data on the domestically produced output was taken from Mexico's Instituto Nacional de Estad istica, Geograf ia e Inform atica INEGI, various years. All other data used in calculations were derived from an industrial surveys performed by INEGI covering a rough 70 of total manufacturing value-added see Grether, 1997 for a detailed description of data selection and treatment. Data was reaggregated to match the 39 industrial categories used by Casar 1993. Capital stock is estimated at the replacement cost of its components. Labor units are expressed in terms of blue collar equivalent hours, using the relative wage to convert white collar hours. The fdi share corresponds to the share of output of those rms whose social capital was, in 1991, controlled by more than 10 by foreign ownership. Finally, following Audretsch and Feldman 1993, the index of geographic concentration is estimated by a Gini coe cient relating the cumulative regional share in employment in a particular sector with the cumulative regional share in total manufacturing employment regions correspond to the 31 states of the Mexican Federation.
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Appendix: Derivation of welfare e ects At a n y point, the economy i s c haracterized by its income-expenditure identity, namely E1; p ; W R1; p ; k ; + Tp 12 where 1 is the price of the num eraire, E: is nationals expenditure function i.e., it excludes the expenditure from onwers of speci c capital. R: is the national revenue function, 39 k is the vector of n domestically-owned speci c factors, and T: is tari revenue.
Di erentiating this identity with respect to p i and letting E i and R i stand respectively for the partial derivatives of the expenditure and revenue functions with respect to p i gives
Let c i and y i stand for nationals consumption and production of good i. Rearranging 13 and using Shephard's and Hotelling's lemmas, and recalling that E W is the inverse of the marginal utility of income which should be equal to one given our quasi-linear utilitu function on the num eraire, we h a ve @W @p i = y i , c i + @T @p i : 14 Now given the small country assumption we h a ve that @p i = @t i . Let us choose units so that all international prices are equal to one; t i = p i ,1 is the tari rate, the speci c and ad-valorem forms being here identical and @p i =@t i = 1 . T h us, tari revenue can 39 The national product could be directly related to Gross National Product i. 
